Wheat v. United States

486 U.S. 153 (1988)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Wheat (D), along with others, was charged with participating in a drug distribution conspiracy. D received and stored large shipments of marijuana at his home, then distributed the marijuana to customers in the region. Juvenal Gomez-Barajas (D1) and Javier Bravo (D2), were also charged and represented in their criminal proceedings by Iredale, attorney at law. D1 was tried first and was acquitted on drug charges overlapping with those against D. To avoid a second trial on other charges D1 offered to plead guilty to tax evasion and illegal importation of merchandise. D2 decided to forgo trial and plead guilty to one count of transporting approximately 2,400 pounds of marijuana from Los Angeles to a residence. At the conclusion of D2's guilty plea, Iredale notified the District Court that he had been contacted by D and had been asked to try D's case as well. The United States (P) objected over the possibility of conflict in the representation. P contends that the Court had not yet accepted D1's plea and sentencing arrangement and until then D1 would be free to withdraw the plea and stand trial. D through his participation in the drug distribution scheme, was familiar with the sources and size of D1's income, and was thus likely to be called as a witness for P at any subsequent trial of D1. This scenario would pose a conflict of interest for Iredale, who would be prevented from cross-examining D and thereby from effectively representing D1. P has contacted Iredale and asked that D2 be made available as a witness to testify against D, and agreed in exchange to modify its position at the time of D2's sentencing. Ethical proscriptions would forbid Iredale to cross-examine D2 in any meaningful way. D emphasized his right to have counsel of his own choosing and the willingness of D1, D2, and D to waive the right to conflict-free counsel. If called to testify, D2 would simply say that he did not know petitioner and had no dealings with him; no attempt by Iredale to impeach D2 would be necessary. Further, in the unlikely event that D1 went to trial on the charges of tax evasion and illegal importation, D's lack of involvement in those alleged crimes made his appearance as a witness highly improbable. All three defendants agreed to allow Iredale to represent D and to waive any future claims of conflict of interest. D contends that P was manufacturing implausible conflicts in an attempt to disqualify Iredale, who had already proved extremely effective in representing D1 and D2. The Court found an irreconcilable conflict of interest that could not be waived. D proceeded to trial with his original counsel and was convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The District Court had correctly balanced two Sixth Amendment rights: (1) the qualified right to be represented by counsel of one's choice, and (2) the right to a defense conducted by an attorney who is free of conflicts of interest. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.