v.C. v. M.J.B.

748 A.2d 539 (2000)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P and D are lesbians, who began dating and eventually went to see a fertility specialist to begin artificial insemination procedures. D claims she made the final decision to become pregnant independently and before beginning her relationship with P. Two individuals confirmed that D. had been planning to become pregnant through artificial insemination for years prior to the beginning of the parties' relationship. P claims the two discussed having children. P did not become aware of D's visits with the specialist and her decision to have a baby by artificial insemination until September 1993. The doctor's records indicate that D was single and that she 'desires children.' P claims that it was a joint decision. D acknowledged that she consulted P on the issue but maintained that she individually made the final choice about which sperm donor to use. Between November 1993 and February 1994, D underwent several insemination procedures. P attended at least two of those sessions. In December 1993, P moved into D's apartment. On February 7, 1994, D was told that she was pregnant. P and D prepared for the birth of twins by attending pre-natal and Lamaze classes. The parties moved to a larger apartment to accommodate the pending births. P contends that during that time they jointly decided on the children's names. D maintains that she made the final decision regarding names. P took D to the hospital and she was present in the delivery room at the birth of the children. At the hospital, the nurses and staff treated P as if she were a mother. Immediately following the birth, the nurses gave one child to D to hold and the other to P and took pictures of the four of them together. D took a three-month maternity leave, and P took a three-week vacation. They opened joint bank accounts for their household expenses, and prepared wills, powers of attorney, and named each other as the beneficiary for their respective life insurance policies. They also opened savings accounts for the children and named P as custodian for one account and D as custodian for the other. During the twenty-three months after the children were born, the parties and the children functioned as a family unit. Both parties cared for the children. D insists that she made substantive decisions regarding their lives. Witnesses regarded the parties as equal co-parents to the children. One witness testified that P was minimally involved in taking care of the children, but acknowledged that P had an important role in the twins' lives. The parties purchased a home in February 1995. Later that year, P asked D to marry her, and D accepted. In July 1995, the parties held a commitment ceremony where they were 'married.' P, D, and the twins were blessed as a 'family.' They joined the Lambda family organization, made up of lesbian and gay parents or expectant parents. They discussed both changing the twins' surname to a hyphenated form of the women's names and the possibility of P adopting the children. In August 1996, D ended the relationship. P spent approximately every other weekend with the children and contributed money toward the household expenses. In May 1997, D went away on business and left the children with P for two weeks. Later that month, D refused to continue P's visitation with the children, and at some point, D stopped accepting P's money. P filed this complaint for joint legal custody. The trial court denied P's applications for joint legal custody and visitation because it concluded that she failed to establish that the bonded relationship she enjoyed with the children had risen to the level of psychological or de facto parenthood. The trial court held that it would 'only be able to consider P's petition for custody if [she] was able [to] prove D to be an unfit parent.' P did not allege that D was an unfit parent, the trial court held that P lacked standing to petition for joint legal custody. The court denied visitation. P appealed. The Appellate Division reversed on visitation: it analyzed the case under the best interests of the child standard, and, based on the record before it, determined that joint legal custody was not in the best interests of the children. It then concluded that D cannot deprive P or the twins of visitation simply because D harbors negative feelings toward P. Relying on the experts' testimony, the majority concluded that P's continued contact with the children is in their best interests. An order for visitation was established. Both parties appealed.