Plyler v. Whirlpool Corporation

751 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014)

Facts

Seven years after P purchased a D microwave oven and installed it above the stove a fire occurred. P used the microwave to heat some food. Eight hours later, P's houseguest woke him, warning him of a fire in the microwave. P saw three fires inside of it and noticed an orange glow near the top of the unit. P attempted to put the fire out but had to call for help. Firefighters extinguished the fire. P suffered physical and emotional injuries. P injured his elbow and knee while he ran into and out of his house during the fire, and he experienced post-traumatic stress disorder that he attributed to watching his house burn. An investigator for the fire department determined that the fire had originated near the top of the microwave, but he could not identify a specific cause and reported the cause as 'undetermined.' P blamed the fire on a product defect that where D had to recall several brands of microwaves. Latack, D's Director of Global Product Safety, testified about that defect and when it posed a risk of fire. There were two circumstances for the recall: (1) the microwave contained splattered food that had gone uncleaned for an extended time, and (2) the microwave was running at the time of the fire. P testified that he kept the microwave very clean and never left splattered food remaining inside the unit. P testified that on the night of the fire, the microwave had been off for several hours and was not running when the fire started. After D discovered that 1.8 million microwaves contained a defect that posed a fire risk, D issued a recall through the Consumer Product Safety Commission. D was able to repair 75 percent of the microwaves covered by the recall. P claimed that he never received notice about the recall, but he could not remember whether he had submitted a product registration card for his microwave. P paid for the microwave with a credit card and claimed that D should therefore have been able to obtain from the dealer his contact information and notify him, along with all other credit card purchasers, of the recall. During trial, the court had refused to allow P to testify to his 'interpretation' of what he observed, limiting him only to his actual observations. The court held that it prohibited P, a lay witness, merely from giving expert testimony, but still allowed him to give 'extensive testimony about his perceptions of the fire. D got the verdict on the negligence and strict liability claims. P appealed.