People v. Burton

6 Cal.3d 375 (1971)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Vicky Price was sitting in her car, when Burton (D) approached her car on the driver's side, put a gun to her head and ordered her to get out of the car. While she was attempting to comply with this order, she heard a voice addressing her from the other side of the car. The next thing she knew defendant's gun had gone off and wounded her. D fled. Six days later the dead bodies of Joseph and Isabelle Diosdado were discovered lying on the floor of their feed store in Compton. They had each been shot twice. The cash register was empty, and coins were scattered on the floor. The bullet recovered from Vicky Price and the bullets removed from the Diosdados were all fired from the same gun. D was arrested. His father arrived at the police station and asked to see him. The request was refused. The police thereafter advised D of his Miranda rights, interrogated him, and obtained a confession. At trial, D moved to exclude the confession on the ground that it was (1) involuntary and (2) illegally obtained in violation of Miranda. The judge rejected those arguments. D had in fact asked the police repeatedly whether he could see his parents, and they refused. This testimony was never contradicted. [On appeal on the confession matter the appeals court held that: when a minor is taken into custody and subjected to interrogation, without the presence of an attorney, his request to see one of his parents, made at any time prior to or during questioning, must, in the absence of evidence demanding a contrary conclusion, be construed to indicate that the minor suspect desires to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. The police must cease custodial interrogation immediately upon exercise of the privilege. The police did not so cease in this case, the confession obtained by the subsequent questioning was inadmissible, and, therefore, the admission of such confession was prejudicial per se and compels reversal of the judgment on all counts.] D also contends that it was error to instruct the jury on first degree felony murder, because the underlying felony was armed robbery. He claims that armed robbery is an offense included in fact within the offense of murder and, therefore, under the rule announced in People v. Ireland such an offense cannot support a felony-murder instruction.