In Re M.J.

787 N.E.2d 144 (2003)

Facts

M is a single woman who was 40 years old, and F is a male who was 57 years old. M and F first met in 1986 and began an intimate relationship lasting 10 years. F introduced himself to Alexis as 'Jim Richardson' and told her that he was divorced. The parties discussed marriage. M and F are of different races, and it is alleged that F told M that upon his retirement, they would move to another community and be married. Despite their attempts to conceive, M did not become pregnant, and it became apparent that F could not father children. F suggested that M become artificially inseminated by an anonymous donor as a means to have their child. M claims that F promised her that he would provide financial support for any child born by means of artificial insemination. F's written consent to the procedure was never obtained. F provided financial assistance for the insemination procedure; accompanied M to the doctor's office for examinations; injected M with medication designed to enhance her fertility; and participated in selecting the donor so that the offspring would appear to be a product of their relationship. On the fifth attempt, M became pregnant and gave birth to twin boys in 1993. F participated in selecting names for the children. After the births, F acknowledged the children as his own. He also provided support for them in the form of monthly payments of cash and the purchase of food, clothing, furniture, toys, and play equipment. In her complaint, M further describes many family vacations with F to 10 different states and Mexico and alleges that F also paid for the children's medical, travel, and entertainment expenses. In 1996, M discovered that F was not named Jim Richardson and that he was married. Upon discovering F's true name and marital status, M ended their relationship. Since 1996, F has provided no financial support for the children. M filed a complaint seeking to establish paternity and impose a support obligation for the benefit of the twin boys. M sought to impose child support obligations by invoking common law theories of breach of an oral agreement and promissory estoppel, a declaration of paternity, and establishment of child support pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act. F filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court interpreted the Illinois Parentage Act as requiring that a husband consent in writing before he is treated in law as the natural father of a child conceived to his wife by means of artificial insemination. By analogy M's common law theories were not actionable because the Illinois Parentage Act expressly requires written consent. The appellate court held that written consent is required before an unmarried man becomes legally obligated to support a child born as a result of artificial insemination. Based on its decision, the appellate court did not reach the issue concerning the Frauds Act.