Agostini v. Felton

521 U.S. 203 (1997)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Title I channels federal funds, through the States, to “local educational agencies” (LEA's). The LEA's spend the funds to provide remedial education, guidance, and job counseling to eligible students. An eligible student is one (i) who resides within the attendance boundaries of a public school located in a low-income area, and who is failing or is at risk of failing, the State's student performance standards. These funds must be made available to all eligible children, regardless of whether they attend public schools, and the services provided to children attending private schools must be “equitable in comparison to services and other benefits for public school children.” Title I services may be provided only to those private school students eligible for aid, and cannot be used to provide services on a “school-wide” basis. Petitioner, Board of Education of the City of New York (P), has grappled with how to provide Title I services to the private school students within its jurisdiction. P initially arranged to transport children to public schools for after-school Title I instruction. This failed. Attendance was poor, teachers and children were tired, and parents were concerned for the safety of their children. P then moved the after-school instruction onto private school campuses. This program yielded mixed results. P then implemented a plan that the Court evaluated in Aguilar v. Felton. That plan provided Title I services on private school premises during school hours. Only public employees could serve as Title I, instructors and counselors. Assignments to private schools were made on a voluntary basis and without regard to the religious affiliation of the employee or the wishes of the private school. Training for the employees included written and oral instructions emphasizing the secular purpose of Title I and setting out the rules to be followed to ensure that this purpose was not compromised. They could not share equipment and materials, team with other teachers not in the program, and could not introduce any religious matter into their teaching or become involved in any way with the religious activities of the private schools. All religious symbols were to be removed from classrooms used for Title I services. In that case, six federal taxpayers, Felton (D), sued P. This Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on the ground that P's Title I program necessitated an “excessive entanglement of church and state in the administration of [Title I] benefits.” On remand, the District Court permanently enjoined P. P then reverted to its prior practice of providing instruction at public school sites, at leased sites, and in mobile instructional units (essentially vans converted into classrooms) parked near the sectarian school. The Board also offered computer-aided instruction, which could be provided “on premises” because it did not require public employees to be physically present on the premises of a religious school. Compliance with Aguilar cost taxpayers $100 million in wasted funds. P and a new group of parents of parochial school students filed motions in the District Court seeking relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The District Court denied the motion because Aguilar's demise had “not yet occurred.” The Second Circuit “affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.