Wiley v. County Of San Diego

19 Cal. 4th 532 (1998)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P was arrested and charged with burglary and various assaultive crimes against DiGiovanni, a former girlfriend with whom he had a stormy relationship. P denied the charges and Deputy Public Defender John Jimenez was appointed to represent him. P claimed he had been at his apartment. Jimenez arranged for an investigator to contact witnesses and prepare a report. The investigator had only limited success in finding anyone to establish an alibi. P took a polygraph test, which Jimenez was informed he 'had not passed.' DiGiovanni testified that after P entered her condominium in a rage, he hit her repeatedly with a wrench, threatened to kill her, and strangled her with a belt until she lost consciousness. Eric, her 11-year-old son, testified that he found his mother lying on the floor and that P had physically abused her on prior occasions. He claimed saw P's truck drive into the cul-de-sac where they lived the morning of the alleged attack. P denied attacking DiGiovanni and said she had been following and harassing him because he wanted to break off their relationship. According to P's landlord, P's truck was parked outside his duplex early on the morning of the alleged assault, and he did not see P enter or leave his residence. Numerous character witnesses also attacked DiGiovanni's credibility. P was convicted of battery causing serious bodily injury. P was sentenced to four years. P filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging Jimenez's (D) representation as ineffective due to his inadequate investigation of the defense. P submitted declarations from several of DiGiovanni's neighbors, none of whom had been contacted by the defense investigator. In sum, they stated they had seen DiGiovanni driving away from her residence early on the morning in question and later saw a man other than P banging on her door and shouting, 'Let me in.' They noticed no signs of injury in the days following the incident. The petition was denied. A year later, P filed another habeas corpus petition. P submitted evidence DiGiovanni's son had recanted his statement that P's truck was at the condominium the morning of the alleged attack. The court granted the petition. It held that the son had lied at trial and that his testimony was crucial to the conviction. The court determined Jimenez's (D) inadequate investigation had deprived P of exculpatory witnesses. The prosecutor later dismissed the case. P filed a legal malpractice action against Ds. The court determined P's innocence was not an issue. The jury found in favor of P and awarded him $162,500. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment because the trial court erroneously admitted the transcript of the second habeas corpus hearing and erroneously excluded certain evidence on which Jimenez (D) based his trial strategy: the polygraph examination, a psychological evaluation of P, and a prior domestic violence incident. Ds' arguments on the question of actual innocence were rejected. The court held that 'it is 'difficult to defend logically a rule that requires proof of innocence as a condition of recovery, especially if a clear act of negligence of defense counsel was obviously the cause of the defendant's conviction of a crime.' the court held that creating a separate standard for clients represented in a criminal setting is 'fundamentally incompatible' with the constitutional guaranty of effective assistance of counsel. There was no empirical evidence supported the rationale, advanced by some courts, that the threat of malpractice claims would discourage representation of criminal defendants, particularly those who are indigent. The court also held that an actual innocence requirement would create 'rather artificial distinctions' between criminal defense attorneys and civil attorneys. This appeal resulted.