Illinois v. Krull

480 U.S. 340 (1987)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P's Vehicle Code, has a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating the sale of motor vehicles and vehicular parts. A person who sells motor vehicles, deals in automotive parts, processes automotive scrap metal, or engages in a similar business must obtain a license from the Illinois Secretary of State. Detailed records must be maintained. The statute also required a licensee to permit state officials to inspect these records 'at any reasonable time during the night or day' and to allow 'examination of the premises of the licensee's established place of business for the purpose of determining the accuracy of required records.' D operated an automobile wrecking yard. Detective McNally entered D's yard and asked to see the license and records of vehicle purchases. Lucas (D) could not locate the license or records. McNally then requested and received permission to look at the cars in the yard. Upon checking with his mobile computer the serial numbers of several of the vehicles, McNally ascertained that three of them were stolen. The identification number of a fourth had been removed. McNally seized the four vehicles and placed Lucas (D) was placed under arrest. D, the holder of the license, and Mucerino (D), who was present at the yard on the day of the search, were arrested later. Ds were charged with various criminal violations of the Illinois motor vehicle statutes. The court granted Ds' motion to suppress the evidence seized from the yard in that the state statute authorizing the warrantless searches was ruled unconstitutional in another case. The statute permitted officers unbridled discretion in their searches and was therefore not ''a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.'' The appeals court vacated the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The state trial court adhered to its decision It further concluded that because the good faith of an officer is relevant, if at all, only when he acts pursuant to a warrant, McNally's possible good-faith reliance upon the statute had no bearing on the case. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. The court rejected the State's argument that the evidence seized from D’swrecking yard should nevertheless be admitted because the police officer had acted in good-faith reliance on the statute authorizing such searches. P appealed.