Floyd v. City Of New York

959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (2013)

Facts

Ps assert that D violated both the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Ps 'must prove that 'action pursuant to official municipal policy' caused the alleged constitutional injury.' The Fourth Amendment protects all individuals against unreasonable searches or seizures. The Fourth Amendment permits the police to 'stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause.' 'Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard; hence, the subjective intentions or motives of the officer making the stop are irrelevant.' 'To proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.'' The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees every person the equal protection of the laws. It prohibits intentional discrimination based on race. Intentional discrimination can be proved in several ways, two of which are relevant here. A plaintiff can show: (1) that a facially neutral law or policy has been applied in an intentionally discriminatory manner; or (2) that a law or policy expressly classifies persons on the basis of race, and that the classification does not survive strict scrutiny. Because there is rarely direct proof of discriminatory intent, circumstantial evidence of such intent is permitted. 'The impact of the official action - whether it bears more heavily on one race than another - may provide an important starting point.' The parties presented massive amounts of statistical evidence based on stops between residential areas with more Black, Hispanic, or White residents. Blacks were 30% more likely to be arrested (as opposed to receiving a summons) than whites, for the same suspected crime. For the period 2004 through 2009, after controlling for suspected crime and precinct characteristics, blacks who were stopped were about 14% more likely - and Hispanics 9% more likely - than whites to be subjected to the use of force. For the period 2004 through 2009, all else being equal, the odds of a stop resulting in any further enforcement action were 8% lower if the person stopped was black than if the person stopped was white. In addition, the greater the black population in a precinct, the less likely that a stop would result in a sanction. Together, these results show that blacks are likely targeted for stops based on a lesser degree of objectively founded suspicion than whites. The evidence at trial revealed significant evidence that D acted with deliberate indifference. As early as 1999, D was on notice that stops and frisks were being conducted in a racially skewed manner. Nothing was done in response. In the years following this report, pressure was placed on supervisors to increase the number of stops. Officers have been pressured to make a certain number of stops and risk negative consequences if they fail to achieve the goal. The evidence at trial revealed that D has an unwritten policy of targeting 'the right people' for stops. In practice, the policy encourages the targeting of young black and Hispanic men based on their prevalence in local crime complaints. Supervisors routinely review the productivity of officers but do not review the facts of a stop to determine whether it was legally warranted. Nor do supervisors ensure that an officer has made a proper record of a stop so that it can be reviewed for constitutionality. Deficiencies were also shown in the training of officers with respect to stop and frisk and in the disciplining of officers when they were found to have made a bad stop or frisk. Despite the mounting evidence that many bad stops were made, that officers failed to make adequate records of stops, and that discipline was spotty or non-existent, little has been done to improve the situation.