Rathke v. Macfarlan

648 P.2d 648 (1982)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Ps are merchants engaged in the business of buying and selling precious metals and stones, including gold and silver bullion, coins and currency, jewelry, and similar articles. No purchase is consummated unless and until Ps have simultaneously entered into an agreement, via teletype or other instantaneous communication method, for the resale of the article to a third party. Both purchases and resales are based upon the then-prevailing market rate for the metallic content of the item purchased, which is subject to hourly, daily, and monthly fluctuations. The sales are contingent upon delivery of the article to the new purchaser within 48 hours following the teletype sales commitment. Section 18-16-101 was enacted which regulates Ps' business by imposing holding period and recording requirements on certain purchases of 'valuable articles.' Section 18-16-101 was enacted which regulates Ps' business by imposing holding period and recording requirements on certain purchases of 'valuable articles.' The law placed an identification and holding period on the transaction with the intent to aid law enforcement officials in the discovery and identification of sellers of stolen valuable articles and in the identification and recovery of stolen valuable articles by providing a mandatory record-keeping and reporting system by purchasers and by providing a holding period during which time such articles shall not be disposed of or altered in any manner. P filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of section 18-16-101. P claimed the record-keeping requirements were prohibitively burdensome and because the thirty-day holding period would prevent him from buying gold and silver items in the usual fashion. P claimed the statute was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite; it impermissibly sanctioned general and warrantless police searches of business premises, inventories, and records; it violated due process as a taking of property without just compensation; it was arbitrary, capricious, and confiscatory legislation in that it destroyed or impaired Ps' property, livelihood, and businesses; and it interfered with federal legislation and intruded into an area of exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. The court found that the bookkeeping regulations were burdensome and that the holding requirement would financially impair P's business operations. It found that P had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law with respect to the protection of his constitutional rights. But the court held that P did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute was unconstitutional. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. P appealed.