Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council For Clean Ai

478 U.S. 546 (1986)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

The Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council For Clean Air (P) and the United States each filed suit to compel Pennsylvania (D) to implement a vehicle emission inspection and maintenance program under the Clean Air Act. A consent decree was issued in which D agreed to establish an IM program for 10 counties by August 1, 1980, and called for PennDot to seek legislation to institute a franchising system with garage owners to test cars. The decree also required D to pay P $30,000 for attorney’s fees and costs incurred prior to the entry of the consent decree. Implementation of the IM program did not proceed smoothly. In the Re 5th Casebook on pages 1288-89 there are nine Phases listed that show the difficulties over a five-year period of having the IM program implemented after the consent decree was issued. P then sought attorney’s fees and costs for the work performed after issuance of the consent decree in 1978 to 1983. The District Court awarded P $209,813 in attorney’s fees and an additional $6,675.03 in costs. The court calculated the reasonable number of hours to do the work, then multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate with that rate being based on the court’s determination of attorney’s reputation, status, and type of activity. This generated the lodestar with P’s having the burden of establishing entitlement to the award claimed and any adjustments to the lodestar. The court then determined three hourly rates and then compensated the work according to the difficulty between $100, $65 and $25 per hour. P sought compensation for post-decree litigation work in Phase II and IX. D objected to P seeking compensation for work done in only tangentially related state and federal administrative proceedings. The District Court rejected that argument and found that because the proposed regulations would have affected P’s rights under the consent decree that it has an interest in the proceedings and that made the work sufficiently related to the litigation to be compensable. The court then considered multipliers and found P’s work during Phase V superior and that an increase based on the quality of work which culminated in an outstanding result is fully justified. The District Court then applied a multiplier of two to the awards in Phase IV, V and VII to reflect the low likelihood of success that was faced by D in those stages of the litigation. The court then added another multiplier of two to the Phase V work for the high quality of representation. The final calculations are listed on page 1291 of the Re 5th casebook. The 3rd Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.