The State charged P with one count of aggravated criminal sodomy and one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child based on allegations made by the mother of P's 5-year-old daughter. The district court appointed Sweet-McKinnon to serve as P's trial counsel. After P's first jury trial ended in a mistrial, the case proceeded to a second jury trial. The jury convicted P. P filed a pro se motion to set aside the verdict based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court judge appointed new defense counsel and held an evidentiary hearing, and the judge denied the motion and sentenced P to 442 months' imprisonment. Girard-Brady represented P in his appeal. The Court of Appeals denied relief, and a subsequent petition for review was also denied. P filed a pro se motion in which he alleged ineffective assistance of both trial and direct appeal counsel. The motion was denied, and P appealed the denial to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. The district judge granted the motion and P's case went back onto the trial calendar. P and the State entered a plea agreement, and P entered an Alford plea on two counts of attempted aggravated battery and one count of aggravated endangering a child. P was sentenced to 72 months' imprisonment. P was released from custody for time served. P filed this legal malpractice action against Sweet-McKinnon, Girard-Brady, and BIDS (D). P asserted that he had always denied abusing his daughter. He also asserted that, as a result of malpractice, he had been 'improperly convicted in 2004 and was therefore forced to serve nearly eight (8) years in prison, which would not have occurred had he received proper representation.' P sought $1,600,000 in economic and non-economic damages. Sweet-McKinnon and Girard-Brady moved for judgment on the pleadings. D moved to dismiss on the ground that it lacked the capacity to be sued. The judge ruled that P's Alford plea foreclosed the relief sought. On appeal, the majority held that a criminal defendant must prove actual innocence in order to pursue a malpractice action and that P's plea foreclosed the possibility of marshaling such proof. P appealed.