Illinois v. Vital

447 U.S. 410 (1980)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

While driving a car, John Vitale (D), a juvenile, struck two small children. One of the children died almost immediately; the other died the following day. A police officer at the scene of the accident issued a traffic citation charging D with failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident in violation of 11-601 (a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. D appeared in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of failing to reduce speed. After a trial without a jury, Vitale was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $15. On the following day, December 24, 1974, D with two counts of involuntary manslaughter. D's counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, that the manslaughter prosecution was 'violative of statutory and/or constitutional double jeopardy,' because of Vitale's previous conviction for failing to reduce speed to avoid the accident. The juvenile court found it unnecessary to reach a constitutional question because it held that the manslaughter prosecution was barred by Illinois statutes requiring, with certain nonpertinent exceptions, that all offenses based on the same conduct be prosecuted in a single prosecution. The juvenile court dismissed the petition and the State appealed. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, affirmed the holding that the manslaughter prosecution was barred by the state compulsory joinder statutes. The Supreme Court of Illinois, with two justices dissenting, affirmed on other grounds. It held that D cannot be prosecuted for the offense of involuntary manslaughter' because of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After analyzing the elements of each offense, the court held that because 'the lesser offense, failing to reduce speed, requires no proof beyond that which is necessary for conviction of the greater, involuntary manslaughter, . . . for purposes of the double jeopardy clause, the greater offense is by definition the `same' as, the lesser offense included within it.' The dissenting justices argued that the manslaughter prosecution was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the homicide charge could be proved by showing one or more reckless acts other than the failure to reduce speed.